In one of his most famous texts, "Rebirth of the épiméthéan man", Ivan Illich describes a curious toy seen in a store window in New York:

“*It was a metal casket which, when you touched a switch, snapped open to reveal a mechanical hand. Chromed fingers reached out for the lid, pulled it down, and locked it from the inside. It was a box; you expected to be able to take something out of it; yet all it contained was a mechanism for closing the cover.*”[[1]](#footnote-1)

This passage written in 1970 seems to describe wonderfully our current globalized world and its institutions. While the current political scene presents an opposition between a globalization described as open, universal and going in the direction of a history thought as determined, and a national policy which wants to break with the globalized world, described as closed, excluding and qualified as dangerous backtracking, and in both cases without of course ever explaining precisely how. Between the two, there would be nothing more than gangs of illuminated misfits presented as "*followers of a return to the candle*".

As we see a pandemic hit the world, which seems to follow a series of ecological disasters across the world, this opposition at first glance, seems to make sense and crystallize the debates in the media. Some accuse others of all vices and adorn themselves with all virtues. In the meantime, the situation continues to deteriorate to the point that there is only a decade left to avoid suffering irreversible impacts on the global ecosystem[[2]](#footnote-2). The IPCC notes a correlation between the industrial explosion and the exploitation of coal in the 19th century, an increase in the use of land and therefore of these pollution and soil degradation due on the one hand to the exponential increase in the population, overall and on the other hand to lifestyles and food[[3]](#footnote-3). But at the national level, governments and ruled in industrialized countries not seem inclined to revise their consumerist way of life, they call “purchasing power” whereas in non-industrialized countries now one aspires to it. In a deterministic view of history, we speak of "catching up".

 In his famous book, *The Great Reset*, the chairman of WEF Klaus Schwab discusses both political and environmental issues. He explains that states have been active actors in the health crisis, and seen by the inhabitants of different countries as providential saviors[[4]](#footnote-4). He sees that in the post-pandemic world, they will have a big role to play in the reconstruction of the world. Nevertheless, in his eyes, it is not a question of nationalist "folds", but of reconstructions of economic growth through policies supporting ecological conversion from an economic point of view, but also of the reconstruction of a global order more egalitarian. Schwab does not deny the possible tensions between nation states and the globalized system*[[5]](#footnote-5)*. But in his view, this is not contradictory with the maintenance of the globalization process, provided that the global governance

 "*defined as the process of cooperation among transnational actors aimed at providing responses to global problems […] encompasses the totality of institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives through which nation states try to bring more predictability and stability to their responses to transnational challenges.*”[[6]](#footnote-6)

In one world, the situation should improve through an overhaul starting from international cooperation of states. Thus, for chairman Schwab, if the problem of the opposition between a return to the Nation-State who struggle for a recovery policy and a global green new deal is present and is not inextricable, his reflections are as idealistic as it superficial: the problems exist, so we just have to do this and that to remedy them.

 The point is that our view of history and existence is shaped by the state, archaeological research studied by James C. Scott shows us that this form of social organization only exists in a very small part of human history (about 6% of the history of the species, and in addition it is a discontinuous and non-linear history). This is defined as a social, political, economic, but also and ecological fragile and complex organization[[7]](#footnote-7). We date the birth of the state around 6000 BC in Mesopotamia, when homo-sapiens have been running around, gathering and hunting on Earth for 200,000 years! These 1st entities (in Mesopotamia, Nile or Yellow River) were demographically tiny, serving as points surrounded by a huge ocean of non-state societies[[8]](#footnote-8). For James C. Scott, it was not until the 16th century that this form of social organization became widespread in the world, almost never following an endogenous process, but on the contrary following invasions.

In the 14th century, the North African thinker, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) tried to explain how these societies subject to the state produced goods and comforts for their subjects. For him, the state "settle"[[9]](#footnote-9) the populations living on its conquered lands, that is to say, it breaks the cohesions and the foundations of their societies. This pacification consists in disarm the people, destroying family or tribal solidarity in order to substitute them for services; police, army, hospitals, charities etc…. Then, the autonomy of the communities is destroyed, which on the other hand enjoys unimaginable comfort for previous generations, thus justifying submission to the new established order. New professions are therefore appearing, resulting from the specialization of tasks, making each dependent on the complex productive system ad trade of which the State and the cities are the nerve center. A kind of virtuous circle is thus set up where the cities grow and pay the government a tax, allowing the palace to organize the redistribution between the necessary services to meet the needs to such specific social system, and the needs of the State itself (maintenance of the palace, aristocrats, bureaucrats, soldiers). The countryside also benefits from this growth of cities, and therefore growth of its food needs. Such a system only works through the disarmament of populations, which then become easily taxable. It is therefore for Ibn Khaldun the State and the great transformations it imposes on societies that make it possible to create "production gains" and to collect taxes from them[[10]](#footnote-10).

Therefore, we will first analyze the history of the formation of modern Western states and its variants, a form of state organization that has spread across the globe. We will then try to extract the DNA and decipher the deep ideology of this social and political organization, in order to analyze the question of globalization and its international organizations and put them in touch. We will explore the merits of this alleged opposition between struggle for national revival and international green new deal. From there we will see the dead ends of national state approaches to economic recovery and comprehensive approaches to a "green new deal" in the light of new conceptions, which will open the door for us to see more innovative ideas.

**A modern institution: the State**

 From the 12th century a long but decisive turn of several centuries began. The system of lordships disappeared in favor of feudalism and communal movements, which then weakened in front of the royal powers rise. In France, it was only with Philipe le Bel (late 13th, early 14th century) that the king finally emancipated himself from the feudal lords, and in England only after the wars of roses in the 15th century. Then begin a period of royal power growth, with the rise of an administration organization and a wider use of writing as a tool of government[[11]](#footnote-11). Following this movement, king of France Philippe VI, the January 16th 1347 imposes the royal monopoly to issue money[[12]](#footnote-12). This is a fundamental act: the royal power imposes its sovereignty over the whole kingdom and acquires itself with an instrument to collect taxes more efficiently and to control the movement of goods, commercial activities and capital, banking. This decision also marks the king's supremacy over the aristocracy, which can no longer afford to stand up to him. This decision thus represents a crucial turning point, the royal power giving itself a decisive lever, with the army, the law and the bureaucracy. This control of the currency will thus make it possible to organize a control of the territory, until then very theoretical[[13]](#footnote-13). However, it is only from the 15th century that we can speak of a "state".

 Besides the formation of the state, the other highlight of this period is the rise of the merchant’s paradigm. With the decline of feudalism, a communal movement is gaining in strength and with it the rise of the city elite. Theses political and social changes goes with a change of perception which is illustrated by the rise of a new institution that will have to compete with the monasteries and the Church: the university. In these secular institutions, the students acquire a cultural background, but also technical "skills" in the art of keeping accounts, paperwork etc., and giving the authorities the means to emancipate them from the Church as a service-providing institution[[14]](#footnote-14). With this, a new paradigm appears and rises[[15]](#footnote-15). And it was during the so-called "Renaissance" period that trade was seen as a means of strengthening the prince and the kingdom[[16]](#footnote-16). Indeed, the latter bringing in taxes therefore allows the state to form: Monarch and merchants united against the feudal lords, the emergent state becomes bureaucratized.

 This transformation is accompanied by an evolution of techniques. The new accounting techniques, bills of exchange etc., testify to a change in relation to the world: time, space, materials, fauna, flora, human etc., all things were translated into money then in measure, classification, columns of figures etc. In other words, the world was becoming more and more abstract and intangible, in a self-sustaining movement, money became the measure of everything: “*time was money, and money was power*”[[17]](#footnote-17), and this new power demanded a trade and production increase. These commercial abstractions would then spawn another moral revolution: scientific abstraction. Thus in England, the Royal Society of London, at the forefront of scientific experimentation, was made up of merchants from the City: “*The power given by money and that given by science is the same: that of abstraction, measurement and quantification*”[[18]](#footnote-18).

 However, it would be wrong to see this phenomenon as linear. Many inventions and new technical processes were against the interest of increase of trade. But, as the dominant paradigm and shaping the values system and morality, it is the merchant paradigm that was going to make the durability and development of a technique over others. It was the quest for profit and power that would bring technique and its evolution into a particular historical trajectory[[19]](#footnote-19).

So, the formation of what we call a "state" (in the modern meaning) is the result of a convergence of power (coercion), trade (accumulation) and technology (exploitation):

From the 17th century, the process accelerated and two historical trajectories appeared in France and England. In France, after a century of denigration from city clerics and thinkers, a long period of cultural repression arrived during the 18th century, in order to build a very centralized and hierarchical official culture, adapted to the new organization of power[[20]](#footnote-20). In England, while popular customs and cultures also suffer from the denigration of the elites, considered irrational because they are not driven by the quest for "*happiness*" as Hobbes sees it:

 « *we are to consider that the felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. […]Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter.* »[[21]](#footnote-21)

These are the enclosures that attack popular cultures, not as the production of tales, legends or songs, but as an organized and ritualized whole. Indeed, the enclosures by attacking customs, attack the subsistence of English subjects, therefore the material foundation of their civilization[[22]](#footnote-22). But also, the links with the nobility seem more porous than Mainland Europe order! Indeed, when traveling, the members of the nobility prefer to sleep in the Merchants big houses than in their castles or in the abbeys[[23]](#footnote-23).

 It was under the Tudors that a long period of social and cultural upheaval began. This period that Karl Marx called "*primitive accumulation*" begins, as a moral, cultural, and then social, economic and politic revolution. Because they didn’t aim to produce surplus to accumulate capital, do not work intensively and are not regulated to respect factories hours, lower class become considered irrational and lazy[[24]](#footnote-24). It is therefore through repression and the reform of manners and minds that was for the modern intellectual elites the appropriate way to adapt the people and their behavior to the constraints of the new social order[[25]](#footnote-25). Subsequently, throughout the eighteenth century and until the first third of the nineteenth century, English history will see successive popular revolts and hardening of the regime[[26]](#footnote-26).

**The ideological foundations of the modern era: the Progress**

 It was from the very beginning of the 17th century that the movement of enclosures accelerated. The large landowners appropriated this economic and social institution allowing the subsistence of the weakest: the commons. Subsequently, from 1607, the English law was going to legislate more and more in the sense of these transformations. The same year, a memorandum prepared for the Privy Concil of July, *Consideration of the cause in question Before the Lords Touching Depopulation*, attempted to settle the basic problem posed by the enclosures:

 « *the poor man shall be satisfied in his end, habitation and the gentleman not indered in his desire, improvement*»[[27]](#footnote-27)

It is an authentic anthropological upheaval that took place: The birth of wage labor, as a future system destined to be dominant and the transformation of the institution of nature! This movement, however, encountered popular resistance, which was based on the legitimacy of customs! This period was interpreted by Karl Polanyi as the expression of a fundamental problem of historical modernity: the contradiction between the attachment of the poors to their habitat, their subsistence, the material basis of their cultures, and improvement designates the improvement of means of production, which can be both tools and productive structures. It is thus on the basis of a new paradigm, the nascent states favored improvement to the detriment of habitation.

 This period is a pivotal period in the history of modernity. Everything that makes up the material world can be expressed in numbers and mathematical formulas, therefore accountable, quantifiable, and ultimately cumulative: a stock of productive resources and commodities! But, in order to exploit this stock of resources that we transform into commodities in order to produce other commodities, we must develop the means to transform and produce them: the thermal machine and the men, which we have mentioned above, which then become a strange commodity called "labor power".

This transformation will be based on a new theory of existence, a new vision of the world, a new vision of society and a new vision of people: "political economy". More than a "science", political economy is a revolutionary program for the transformation of society and peoples. This term was born in France under the pen of Antoine de Montchrestien, French thinker of the post-war of religion. For him this cement will be artisanal and commercial activity: "the economy" which will be "political" because regulated by the wisdom of the good king, to unite and establish the legitimacy and authority of the throne, to affirm and strengthen the power of the kingdom[[28]](#footnote-28). In keeping with the times, society is seen as a mass of productive and commercial potential to be organized, regulated, and ordered like a barrack, but also a workshop, then a mill, and finally a factory. Likewise, the subject is already seen as a labor force to be trained and exploited, for the power and influence of the kingdom, in a Christiandom described as fields of economic war[[29]](#footnote-29). The population is seen there as an exploitable resource for the power of the state.

 During the 18th century, Man was described as an individual animal, hunter, gatherer, seeking to maximize his profit. In that case, society would then only be an agglomeration of isolated individuals, calculators in search of satisfaction, centered on their interests, who would, in the best case, no longer be bound by values, rites, common rules, but by "contracts" (the market) and laws (the state). This is a model of society based on a negation of politics because it no longer has a common, therefore questions that accompany the common: a kind of anti-society. This is replaced by technical, legal and contract questions[[30]](#footnote-30). Society must then allow isolated individuals to satisfy their desires, to go in the direction of their individual interests, without harming other individuals.

 That is to say the role of the legislator is to put individuals on a one-way street, in which he must move forward to arrive at "*Happiness*". The role of political institutions is therefore to "make the subjects happy", as it is thought by its theorists. Such a conception does not seem compatible with democracy, but more with a technocracy, in which an elite knowing, competent, specialist, would manage the harmony of contracts and the law in order to produce "*Happiness*"[[31]](#footnote-31). “*Freedom*” would then be the domain of the individual and the collective framework of this “*freedom*” the domain of social technicians! We no longer speak about “community” or “society”, but about “system”.

 We are there before the preliminaries of the industrial revolution in England, and also the birth of the English proletariat, the advent of the all-powerful bourgeoisie, which can then reshape society and even the world as it sees fit and in its image. This therefore required a reform against structures, perceptions, meaning of existence, customs and popular institutions: a real operation of social engineering was then carried out, in order to consecrate a profound anthropological revolution: the disintegration of the economy represented by the creation of fictitious commodities: land, man and money[[32]](#footnote-32).

 It is from this moment that two movements are put in place which fed on each other: an uncontrollable historical chain reaction caused by the disembedding of the market imposing an economic determinism and the technician disembedding imposing a technical determinism, the two sets ultimately resulting in a tragic universal historical determinism.

The ruthless mechanics of the self-regulating market leading to irresistible cultural and mental destruction, first in France and England and then in the colonies, observed by many ethnologists. Indeed, the economic fallacy claims that commercial exchange and production relations are only economic and naturally belong to the domain of a self-regulating market system, which can only generate a utopian society: the market society. However, both viable historical and ethnological research show that exchanges are never purely commercial but also carry a symbolic, social, political and cultural dimension[[33]](#footnote-33). Amputated of one of their vital organs, their material basis, societies and cultures are universally condemned to decay and its members to wandering and deterioration. For Karl Polanyi, it is first and foremost a “cultural catastrophe”, even before an economic disaster[[34]](#footnote-34).

**Regional and international organizations as the extension of the state**

 If the growth of the state accompanies and even allows the emergence of the market society, as a tutor allows the growth of a plant, this also leads the state in its movement of exponential growth. In the 19th century the result of this process was the colonial empires, then the international system. Karl Polanyi describes this system as resting on 4 pillars: 2 political (the balance of power and the liberal state) and 2 economic (the gold standard and the self-regulating market). For him, this organization had the merit of avoiding head-on conflicts between the great industrial powers until 1914, but never achieving peace. Conflicts between minor powers subservient to the big ones multiplied and former non-industrial countries were enslaved (Egypt, Ottoman Empire, Persia, India, China). Interestingly, Polanyi explains to us that what allowed the enslavement of the old empires was not just the guns of the ironclad warships but this curious alliance of the gun and the safe that made up the international system[[35]](#footnote-35).

 At the end of the First World War, an attempt to restore an international system took place with the establishment of the League of Nations, the maintenance of the gold standard and high finance, which in the face of the collapse of 19th century civilization was swept away by the rise of extreme right-wing totalitarianisms and the conflict to which it ended. It was after this war that what we can call "*the civilization of the twentieth century*" was built with the UN and the IMF, but also the WHO. Subsequently, the construction of Europe began, culminating today in the EU, ASEAN, G7 which from 1975 to 2009 steadily grew to become the G20. Later, after the fall of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War, we saw the birth of the WTO and then NAFTA. These international institutions organize relations they want pacified and mechanisms of solidarity in order to build a prosperous and peaceful world. The heads of state and government profess at length of speeches and public interventions the impotence of states, the impotence of governments and promise to defer to international organizations.

 Remarkably, whatever the organization, the geographical space or its object, each of these institutions is animated by a deep ideology which finds its root in the economic fallacies and which, after the Second World War, found a new impulse with this new idea germinating in the minds of the American Democratic Party intellectuals: the development. It was in fact the January 20 1949, Harry Truman in his inauguration speech was going to use for the first time in history, this concept, to describe an economic, social, cultural state, creating at the same time it contrary “underdevelopment”:

“*we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.*”[[36]](#footnote-36)

This invention would have a strong impact on both political and academic minds, as described here by Ivan Illich:

 “*The development paradigm is more easily repudiated by those who were adults on January 20 1949 That day, most of us met the term in its present meaning for the first time when President Truman announced his Point Four Program. Until then, we used 'development' to refer to species, real estate and moves in chess - only thereafter to people, countries and economic strategies. Since then, we have been flooded by development theories whose concepts arc now curiosities for collectors - 'growth', 'catching up', 'modernization', 'imperialism', 'dualism', 'dependency', 'basic needs', 'transfer of technology', 'world system', 'autochthonous industrialization' and 'temporary unlinking '. Each onrush came in two waves. One carried the pragmatist who highlighted free enterprise and world markets; the other, the politicians who stressed ideology and revolution. Theorists produced mountains of prescriptions and mutual cartoons. Beneath these, the common assumptions of all were buried. Now is the time to dig out the axioms hidden in the idea of ​​development itself.*”[[37]](#footnote-37)

This concept was to form the core of international organizations and their ideal. For example, the concept of "peace" finds itself upset and reshaped by this new idea. To understand this, Illich suggests that we make the rapid sociogenesis of our contemporary conception of the term. In a famous speech read in Yokohama in December 1980, he spoke about the relationship between what is believed to be peace and economic development. Neglecting what he calls an "ethnological truism" amounts to transforming "peace" into a technique of "peacekeeping" or order, a matter of technicians of diplomacy and the police. But what is this peace we are told so much about? To talk about it, Illich invites us to return to the meanings of this word in medieval times, in order to enlighten us on what its contemporary use means. Based on his research, he explains that the term “peace” means “to be left in peace”, “to have peace”[[38]](#footnote-38). But to be left in peace, you have to pay a tax! Illich's central thesis in this text is as follows:

“*Under the cover of development, a worldwide war had been waged against people’s peace. In developed areas today, not much is left of the people’s peace. I believe that limits to economic development, origination at the grass roots, are the principal condition for people to recover their peace*”[[39]](#footnote-39)

 Since Harry Truman’s inauguration speech in 1949, development has become something of an alpha and omega of the world wich will hurry to follow. Economic development and "growth" must make individuals happy, their "*quest for happiness*", makes respectability, beauty and would bring peace! A "*Pax oeconomica*"[[40]](#footnote-40) which concretely only consist in a balance of "structurally economic"[[41]](#footnote-41) powers and which exercises on it a certain and worryingmonopoly. Illich called this “*war against subsistence*”, to highlight contrast between Pax Oeconomica and popular peace. However, the non-questioning of this amalgam between “peace & development” make impossible any serious and deep reflection on peace.

 In the 1970s, the precursors of political ecology spoke of these resource limits, degradation, stress, they highlighted the cost of development. Whereas since 1949, the dominant paradigm carried by the UN has conditioned peace on development, as well as the preservation of the environment on development that has since become sustainable[[42]](#footnote-42). In 1987, after 4 years of work, the Brundtland commission (whose members were drawn from industrial powers or from what was then called "developing countries") published a report entitled "our common world". The aim of this commission was less to break with the machines which produce pollution and waste, than to maintain the regime of growth and development, adapted to the new environmental situation:

 “*This Commission believes that people can build a future that is more prosperous, more just, and more secure. Our report, Our Common Future, is not a prediction of ever increasing environmental decay, poverty, and hardship in an ever more polluted world among ever decreasing resources. We see instead the possibility for a new era of economic growth, one that must be based on policies that sustain and expand the environmental resource base. And we believe such growth to be absolutely essential to relieve the great poverty that is deepening in much of the developing world.”[[43]](#footnote-43)*

This text clearly displays a technocratic view on environmental crisis and misery, the answer to the problem created by development is nothing less than another development with new habits. It is never a question of the deep roots of the industrial basis of production, consumerist society, unlimited technique development and there is no deep analysis on misery. The technocrats who create the problem believe they can remedy it by the same way of thinking.

 However, the absence of these questions prevents serious reflections on peace! Worse still, 40 years later, environmentalists have joined the cause of "*the war on subsistence*"[[44]](#footnote-44) while one famous climatologist who was first alerted the public to the problem of global warming is now an ambassador of the nuclear solution[[45]](#footnote-45). Indeed, development necessarily induces the phagocytosis of a culture based on subsistence production, by an economic system based on the endless increase of production, exchange and accumulation. This process necessarily generates an increased dependence on poisonous institutions, causing great social changes that become impossible to do without. This is what he calls "*a non-convivial institution or tool*".

 If the industrial revolution of the 18th-19th centuries was the triumph of *improvement* over *habitation*, this story was never a long quiet river. This period saw the revolt of the peoples, and the 19th century civilization ended with the rise of the extreme right totalitarianism, which, taking note of the bankruptcy of this civilization, aimed not to save it, but to put it to death in order to save its DNA, to create a chimera, by mixing it with fascist DNA and preventing any genuine social revolution.

**Economic recovery and ecological problems**

 The 20th century civilization, built on the ashes of the old world, aroused hope with the ideology of development, picked up both by the capitalist and Soviet worlds, but also in the third world. At the beginning of the 21st century, when the alarmist ecological situation need radical changes and based on Brundtland’s report’s ideology, a globalized technocracy calls for a Green New Deal, although a part of the populations of the industrialized countries rejects the diktats of a distant technocracy see as contemptuous. Then, reactions appear in Russia, Hungary, England, but also in the United States, India and Brazil which seems to be popular counter-movements, but in fact are not. Indeed, a popular counter-movement would consist of citizen movements to protect themselves from exploitation and reduction to the commodities state. But behind demagogues, we observe phenomena of conservation of a national industry made obsolete by the environmental situation, the world order and the frightening technical means. The minds are drowned in a hubbub where demagogues from the left are opposed to demagogues from the right, arguing whether a national technocracy or an international technocracy is more able to "settle" the social, economic, political and environmental problems. In the end all are reduced to mere technical problems. In short, two factions are fighting over how to prolong industrial civilization and the self-regulating market system.

 Those debates highlight a total misunderstanding of the problem. While the nation-states presented themselves as protectors and legitimate representation of popular sovereignty which would be expressed through elections, they were reduced to be nothing more than development planners, against society[[46]](#footnote-46). Institutions have extended disproportionately and finally destroy people’s society and also the values they would represent and materialized: this is the threshold of counter-productivity. In fact, there were founded to offer services to populations, but finally grown up to the point to exceed a critical mass and become counterproductive. Thus, the school make people imbecile, transport immobilizes or wastes time and the hospital develops illnesses. In fact, it is the technocratic becoming of the world that is targeted and that annihilates the human and natural substance of society[[47]](#footnote-47). Thus, under the influence of these institutions and the action of conglomerates of expert and technocrats, a population capable to form politically active citizens, on the contrary is reduce to become a populace or a passive and immature mass of consumers and users like the Pawnee described by Alexander Lesser "*From cultural maturity as Pawnee they were reduced to cultural infancy as white men*"[[48]](#footnote-48).

 These technocratic solutions without ever solving a problem provoke a paradoxical phenomenon on society: while a mass of increasingly trained and competent labor force leaves school, the atoms that compose society become helpless when leave the workplace; Good labor force, impotent citizen! Men become only capable of thoughts and actions in the context of their salaried work, but once they leave the factory or the office, they lose all independent capacity and autonomy. A human degradation noted people's lives as a whole, thus developing their impotence, as described by journalist André Gorz:

"*Our way to professionalizing the services that people from millennia provided themselves, consist to make them incapable of taking care of themselves and the further we go, more the development of the service society accentuates this dispossession of people’s ability to take charge themselves, the myth being that a professional will always do it better than you.*"[[49]](#footnote-49)

Dependent on tangible and intangible goods, the one we want to be a citizen is no longer reduced to being just the taxpayer, user or consumer of goods bought or rented on the market. It is an extremely perverse relationship that is developing between people and what their environment offers them. Then, living in a technicalized, industrialized and merchandized environment made "*easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism*"[[50]](#footnote-50). Today appear new needs and new goods necessary to live in society and therefore new costs and expenses, as well as a dependence system via social assistance: this is modernized poverty[[51]](#footnote-51). This is how the national economic recovery plans, far from fighting against the impoverishment of the populations, keep them in a vicious circle and have the sole purpose of producing economic growth, pillar witch support infrastructure (economic) as well, than the superstructure (or the imaginary). Growth, from an ecological point of view, consists of nothing other than the transformation of man's natural environment into accumulated capital and pollution and waste.

 In the 1970s, the French ethnologist, disciple of Claude Levi Strauss, Philippe Descola, explained that nature was a social institution which recounts and defines the relationships between human and "non-human"[[52]](#footnote-52). Nature is an integral part of culture insofar as the environment is where people live, where they work, hunt, cultivate, reproduce, move, get sick, take care of themselves etc. It is from there that men find the means and matter to satisfy their needs which, as said Marshal Sahlins, are expressed in terms of culture. The environmental situation, because it results to what we do from our worldview and imaginary, is the expression of a mental, moral, spiritual and therefore cultural dislocation of men: finding themselves caught in a destructive whirlwind, they build a hostile environment which will ultimately make human existence degraded[[53]](#footnote-53)*.*

 This is a deep flaw in the economy and the techno-scientific paradigm since the 17th century, consisting of an inability to understand and apprehend what escapes the quantifiable and therefore the destruction engendered by the transformation of the world. M. Schwab think as an engineer and seem prisoner of this paradigm. He think the question of the environment is only from an utilitarian point of view. What we call nature is useful for the health of humans seen as consumers and users, and it is as such that it should be preserved: its degradation is dangerous for consumers and therefore for the economy. As both of economists and technophile’s theorists, he lack of what can understand what is escape of this way of reasoning: disvalue. This mean the destruction of all the benefits produced within a society that generates mainly use value (therefore subsistence economy), destruction caused by the abolition of the commons to establish an economic system based on the production of exchange value[[54]](#footnote-54).

 Karl Polanyi defined nature as a pillar institution of societies, from which men produce their subsistence, establish their social organizations, think about their existence and transmit it to the youngest. It is for this reason that we believe that "*The dangers to man and nature cannot be neatly separated*"[[55]](#footnote-55). This does not mean that the nature and the respect we owe it are arbitrary and can be transformed at the whim of the desiderata of a vulgar progressivism. Nature as a social institution means that the relationship between people in society and their environment are socialized, organized, ritualized and limited by custom, laws, morals, traditions and beliefs. The "social constructions" inherited from the past are not simple arbitrary things that can be reshaped according to subjective fantasies: they are artifices that incorporate the past dialectic of chance and necessity.

 The current dramatic environmental situation, which the covid19 pandemic is only an avatar, follows a series of disasters happened during 2019 (and even long before). This is due to a techno-scientist conception of existence, which since Galileo and Bacon considers everything as a measurable resource, therefore able to be dominated and ultimately exploitable. A technocratic organization can only propose a technical management of problems, in Kafkaesque reflection like turning around non-stop in a closed circle. The technocratic organization of international institutions and the idea of ​​a Green New Deal consist only in a technical conversion of the methods of production, delivery, consumption and treatment of new wastes; the old oil industry is going to be replaced by the electricity industry or renewable energy; that is just leaving an old industrial infrastructure to perish and launch another industrial chain reaction fountainhead of growth. The issue of the environment is no longer reduced to being a technical, administrative, economic issues, it also becomes geopolitical, theological, ideological, demagogic, electoral but never ecological.

 Because these organizations are based on a technocratic vision of societies and their environments, national states and international organizations are no more opposed than a father and a son can be. These international institutions were not born by spontaneous generation, but by creations of national technocratic officer. The apparent oppositions between proponents of solutions to the world's problems through international organizations and proponents of a return to the state-national framework for an economic recovery represent nothing more than a dialectical agitation which should only lead to an anecdotal change in the course of globalization. From our point of view, the problem is broader and deeper.

 Ecology is first a relationship to the world, and therefore a cultural, social, political and philosophical question. It is a about re-enchasing nature, man and politic in society and putting an end to the iron law of the self-regulating market and productivist worldview, even if it’s loosely regulated by a narrow technocratic elite ("narrow" because just a few ingeneer and bureaucrats and because there narrow worldview). In their speech about full of words like “innovation”, “future”, “modernity” etc., they just apply the logic of the old exploitation of coal and hydrocarbons to other resources but not yet exhausted, replace one way of consuming by another way of consuming, and finally re-educating homo oeconomicus to save homo oeconomicus[[56]](#footnote-56). In fact, it would be initiate a new stage in the war against subsistence (Illich) or the offensive of improvement against habitation: "*If we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change*"[[57]](#footnote-57). Naturally, populations put up resistances to it, some make sens[[58]](#footnote-58), others based on nostalgic feelings fuss in a vacuum of sense and clinging to an ancient world that dies[[59]](#footnote-59).

 Then it becomes more and more urgent to question an entire aesthetic of excessiveness (increasingly tall buildings, larger and larger planes, increasingly long roads, increasingly connected, powerful, capable machines. etc., and also the heroic stories of these heralds of our time, Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Uğur Şahin and Özlem Türeci etc.) for another, based on measurement, as recommended by Karl Polanyi:

 “*The spiritual forces that are ready to take over in our personal lives are dispersed today in a windmill fight against the reality of society. Moral courage shall reveal the inner limitations of technological progress and freedom. The search for ~~creative~~ limits is maturity.*”[[60]](#footnote-60)

An idea of limits as expression of maturity that Illich called "*technological maturity*": below a certain minimal threshold of technical development, men are powerless to satisfy their needs, but above a certain threshold, man is domesticated by his industrial techniques, becoming dependent and enslaved by technical system[[61]](#footnote-61). Maturity then consists of staying within these ad hoc defined limits[[62]](#footnote-62).

 Karl Polanyi took over this criticism to point out the danger of a technique and a perverted relationship to it, for freedom, democracy and the essence of man. More than losing oneself in sterile oppositions between yesterday's capitalism and tomorrow's capitalism, struggle of nations in or out international cooperative institutions, it is about building a democratic society, by freeing oneself from the sacred transferred to technology, in order to re-politicize society and its future:

 “*Science can clarify the dimensions of man's realm in the universe. Only a political community can dialectically choose the dimensions of the roof under which its members will live.*”[[63]](#footnote-63)

This is one of the great dangers is going to be: the reaction of elites to the popular contestations that would like to resist against the new world as theorized in Davos or in the corridors of international institutions, and after the historic failure of fascism. Their reaction to those counter movements is going to be the establishment of a new kind of totalitarianism, justified by the best pretexts: peace, health, ecology and happiness, on the model of technocracies confiscating sovereignty, reducing the remaining scraps of democracies to the state of folkloric sham. More a struggle within nation than a struggle of nations. It is no more than empowering oneself to choose between conscious freedom and the “happiness” offered by The Grand Inquisitor based on mystery, miracle and authority.

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7. James C. Scott, Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States, Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 117 to 127 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ibid., p. 219-220 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Or "domesticate" at Scott's idea. In Khaldunian language, "to settle" means "to disarm", as opposed to "Bedouins" which designates the tribal populations which arms each of its male members. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Gabriel Martinez gros, *brève histoire des empires, comment ils naissent ils disparaissent*, Point, 2016 p. 16-17 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
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13. Ibid., p. 255-257 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ivan Illich, *River North of the Future: The Testament of Ivan Illich As Told to David Cayley*, House of Anansi press Inc., Toronto p. 47-48 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
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16. Ibid., p. 114 et suiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and civilization*, University of Chicago press edition, 2010 p. 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., p.25 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
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23. Paul Murray Kendall, L'Angleterre au temps de la guerre des deux roses, Fayard, 1962, trad. 1984, p. 275 to 277 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
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27. *Considération of the cause in question Before the Lords Touching Depopulation*, cit. in, 1995

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28. Antoine de Monchretien, *Traité d’économie politique*, 1616 p. 145  [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Antoine de Monchrétien, p. 103 & next [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Dominique Meda, *le travail, une valeur en voie de disparition*, Op.Cit., p. 84 to 88 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. An idea that we find in Quesnay, leader of the physiocrats [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Karl Polanyi, *The Great transformation, The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, chapter 13: Birth of the Liberal Creed (Continued): Class Interest and Social Change, BEACON PRESS BOSTON, then later he drives the point home in The livelihood of man, the economic fallacy [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. And this whatever the civilization. For example in China, the Dispute over salt and iron, dating from the Han dynasty is the most perfect illustration of this. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Karl Polanyi, *The Great transformation, The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, p. 164 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Karl Polanyi, *The Great transformation,* Op.cit., chap. 1 & 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Harry S. Truman's Inaugural Address, Delivered 20 January 1949: <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMDictionnaire?iddictionnaire=1892> [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ivan Illich, *Shadow works*, Published simultaneously in the United States, Canada and Great Britain 1981 by Marion Boyars Inc., 1981, p.15 <http://www.mom.arq.ufmg.br/mom/imagens_agenda/Shadow%20Work%20-%20Ivan%20Illich.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid., p. 17 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Ibid., p. 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Ibid., p. 20-21 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Ibid., p. 19

“Structurally economic”, that is to say countries and societies which can only be conceived from the point of view that Polanyi would qualify as “economicist”: this time or the existence of a group of men and their environment, cannot is conceived only as a productive entity. In the past, only modern states could claim to be actors in this pax oeconomica, but since globalization, large firms have entered into this game to the point that a country like Denmark has created an embassy to GAFAM:

Peter Baugh, *“Techplomacy”: Denmark’s ambassador to Silicon Valley*, Politico, July 20, 2017 <https://www.politico.eu/article/denmark-silicon-valley-tech-ambassador-casper-klynge/> [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Sustainable Development Goals: <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-action/> [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, p. 11 number 3: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid., p. 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Thom Mitchell, *Father Of Climate Change’ James Hansen Urges Support For Nuclear Energy At #COP21 Climate Talks*, newmathilda.com, December 4, 2015 : <https://newmatilda.com/2015/12/04/father-of-climate-change-james-hansen-urges-support-for-nuclear-energy-at-cop21-climate-talks/> [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, New York: Norton, 1979 p. 77 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, p. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Alexander Lesser, *The Pawnee Ghost Dance Hand Game*, p. 44, cit. in., *The Great transformation*, P. 301 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Transcription of audio extracts from the following documents: "*A bare voice: great interviews of yesterday and today*", by Marie-France Azar, series broadcast from March 4 to 8, 1991 on France Culture. CD inserted in Michel Contat's book "*André Gorz, vers une société libéré*" INA audio documents. Textual Editor, April 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Slavo Zyzek Interview collected by Eric Aeschimann (in Ljubljana), in 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
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52. Descola, Philippe, Par delà nature et culture, Beyond Nature and Culture, Janet Lloyd (trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Branislaw Malinowski, *a theory of culture*, First published as a Galaxy Book, by arrangement with The University of North Carolina Press, 1960 Second Printing, 1961p. 122 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ivan Illich, *In the miror of the past*, Published simultaneously in the United States, Canada and Great Britain 1981 by Marion Boyars Inc., 1992, p. 75 & next [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. K. Polanyi, *The Great transformation*, chap. 15, p. 200 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. With for example Bill Gates, Ban Ki Moon or the Managing Director of the World Bank Kristalina Georgieva in the report: Adapt now: A global call for leadership on climate resilience, here : <https://gca.org/about-us/the-global-commission-on-adaptation/>

; or Bill Gates and the EU: Climate change: European Commission and Bill Gates-led Breakthrough Energy launch €100 million clean energy investment fund, Press release17 October 2018Brussels <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6125> [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. As said Tancrede Falconeri to his uncle in the book and the movie Il Gatopardo (Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Amerindian movements in Chiapas, Pachamama or supak kausay, some growth objectors in the West [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. in a movement not populist, but rather nationalist demagoguery) [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Karl Polanyi: Lecture - "*Freedom in a Complex Society*" - Notes, 1957: <http://kpolanyi.scoolaid.net:8080/xmlui/handle/10694/976?show=full> [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Hence our inability to even envision viable solutions to ecological problems. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ivan Illich, *Energy and equity*, Harper and raw, New York, 1974 p. 73 to 77 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ivan Illich, *tools for conviviality*, First published in the U.S.A. by Harper & Row in their World Perspective Series, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, 1973, Published in Great Britain by Calder & Boyars 1973 p. 103

"*Austerity*" in the vision of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas, which is based on friendship: “*virtue which does not exclude all enjoyments, but only those which are distracting from or destructive of personal relatedness. For Thomas 'austerity' is a complementary part of a more embracing virtue, which he calls friendship or joyfulness.*” p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-63)